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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6412 
 
TOWN OF CORINTH, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All paid full and part-time Emergency Medical Technicians and 
Paramedics. 
 
   Excluded: Director, Emergency Medical Services and Medical Director, 
Emergency Medical Services, and all other employees. 
Certification - C-6412 - 2 - 
 
 
 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  January 24, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
        
 
 
                                                                    
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CAYUGA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PROFESSIONALS, 
 
Charging Party,     CASE NO. U-32511 
- and – 
 
CAYUGA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
 
Respondent. 
____________________________________________ 
 
SUSAN M. DeCARLO, LRS, for Charging Party 
 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (COLIN M. LEONARD of counsel), 
for Respondent  
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER  
 This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that Cayuga Community College (College) violated § 209-a.1 (d) of 
the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when, after the retirement of 
members of the bargaining unit represented by the Cayuga Community College 
Educational Support Professionals (ESP), the College, without bargaining, reassigned 
work previously exclusively performed by unit members to retirees, who were re-hired 
on a part-time basis, and to other non-unit part-time employees.1  For the reasons 
stated below, we affirm the ALJ’s decision, except as to claims not raised in the charge, 
as to which we reverse the finding and modify the order. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 
The College excepts to the ALJ’s factual findings as to the exclusivity of the work 
                                            
1 47 PERB ¶ 4599 (2014).  
Case No. U-32511  - 2 - 
 
  
performed by unit members in the Nursing and Physical Education Offices, the 
Academic Program Office (APO), and the Campus Support Office (CSO), and to the 
ALJ’s finding that their reassigned duties were unchanged.2  The College further 
contends that the ALJ erred in finding that the College violated the Act by transferring 
the work.3   
The College also asserts that the ALJ erred in reaching facts and claims that 
were not pleaded in the charge.4  Additionally, the College objects to the ALJ’s 
determination that “an employer has the duty to bargain prior to a transfer of work, 
regardless of any demand by the union.”5  The College also contends that the ALJ erred 
in denying its affirmative defenses of waiver and duty satisfaction.6   
Finally, the College argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the College’s right to 
determine the scope of its work does not control where the services continue and are 
“simply reassigned to non-unit employees,” that it had not established a reduction in 
services  that an employer’s means by which it makes changes to the non-mandatory 
subjects of staffing and levels of services are themselves mandatory, and that an 
employer’s reasons of financial and operational efficiency do not impact the negotiability 
of the decision to transfer the work.7   
FACTS 
The parties agree that the bargaining unit represented by the ESP is limited to 
full-time employees, defined in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement as those 
                                            
2 Exceptions Nos. 1-6, 8-9, 11-13, 14, 15, 16. 
3 Exception Nos. 11-13, 22. 
4 Exception No. 7.   
5 Exception No. 10. 
6 Exception No. 21. 
7 Exception Nos. 17, 19, 18, 20. 
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employees working 37.5 hours per week.8   
On December 31, 2012, six full-time employees in the bargaining unit retired.  
Rather than fill the full-time positions rendered vacant by these retirements, the College 
in January 2013 rehired three of the newly retired employees on a part-time basis, and 
hired two additional part-time employees.  At issue before us are four of the former 
positions: (1) Janet Mudge, senior typist in the Nursing and Physical Education Offices; 
(2) Melanie Pasik, senior typist in the APO; (3) Darlene Nowey, principal stenographer 
in the APO; and (4) Sharon Bower, office manager of the Campus Services Office. 
Before her retirement, Janet Mudge was employed full-time as a senior typist in 
the Nursing and Physical Education offices.  The ALJ found that Mudge served as 
secretary to the director of nursing and to the athletic director and handled clerical work 
for both offices.  When she was rehired on a part-time basis, her duties were limited to 
the Nursing Office.  Christine Nichols was hired as a part-time typist in the Physical 
Education Office.  After the filing of the charge, Nichols was laid off from her part-time 
position as typist on or about August 31, 2013.9 
Steven Keeler, Chair of the Humanities Division, testified that Pasik and Nowey 
continued to perform the same clerical duties as they had as full-time employees, 
“including handling mail, scheduling meetings, making copies and maintaining division 
records, as well as responding to students who walk in to the office.”10   Keeler further 
testified that Nowey also continues to record minutes for academic area meetings.11  
                                            
8 Charge, ¶¶ 5(E), (F), and (I); Answer ¶¶ 5 (E), (F), and (I); see also Joint Ex 1, Art. I §§ 
4, 6; Art. II § 1. 
9 Tr, at p 31. 
10 47 PERB ¶ 4599, at 4884. 
11 47 PERB ¶ 4599, at 4884; Tr. 132-133.   
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Additionally, ESP witness Patricia Hamberger, another unit member, testified that Pasik 
has continued her duties as secretary for the academic standing committee, including 
scheduling meetings at which student petitions for readmittance are considered and 
gathering the necessary student records prior to those meetings.  Both Hamberger, and 
Keeler, testified that Pasik continues to be responsible for maintaining updates to the 
college syllabi, which are maintained on her computer.12 
Vice President for Student Affairs Jeffery Rosenthal testified to his reduced need 
for clerical assistance as compared to his predecessor Deborah Moeckel, and to the 
increased use of technology having further reduced the need for clerical support. On 
two of the five days of the week, only one of the two was present, although that did not 
affect the hours during which the office was open.     
Sharon Bower served as the office manager in the CSO for five years before her 
retirement on December 31, 2012. The ALJ described as “[t]he primary duties of the 
office manager in the campus services office, ie, the management responsibilities of 
scheduling and overseeing the work of the office and switchboard staff, as well as the 
management of the campus mailboxes and bulk mailings.”13  Bower took on some of 
that work herself, which was also performed by both unit members and part-time 
employees.14 
As office manager, Bower reported directly to Whalen.  Bower consulted with 
Whalen on office issues as she believed appropriate, including major scheduling 
concerns, such as an employee being out on extended leave. Bower testified that she 
                                            
12 Tr, at pp 133-135 (Hamberger); 142 (Keeler). 
13 47 PERB ¶ 4599, at 4886. 
14 Tr, at pp 103-104. 
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was responsible for scheduling “continuous coverage six days a week” for the College’s 
switchboard, except for on holidays and Christmas and spring break.15  Additionally, 
Bower testified that she scheduled staffing of the CSO itself, which in conjunction with 
the switchboard scheduling, she testified, “took up a majority of the time because it was 
very fluid,” between vacation and employees calling in sick.16  Bower testified that, if she 
could not cover gaps, she had to fill them in herself.  She additionally testified that 
“[f]rom time to time,” when scheduling issues such as presented by an employee on 
Workers’ Compensation arose, she would raise these issues with Whalen.17  
Additionally, Bower testified that she had sole responsibility for bulk mailings.  
After Bower’s retirement, Whalen took over scheduling SCO and switchboard 
staffing. Bower’s other supervisory duties have been assumed primarily by the full-time 
switchboard operator in that office, and part-time employees perform her bulk mailing 
and campus mailbox duties. 
Whalen testified that the positions vacated by Mudge, Pasik, and Nowey had not 
been backfilled, because each of them “backfilled her own position.”18  He further 
testified that Bower’s position was not filled due to the College’s financial difficulties, and 
Diane Hutchinson described the significant financial distress the College was 
experiencing in 2012.    
DISCUSSION 
As a preliminary matter, we reject the College’s argument that “the charge should 
be dismissed in its entirety because ESP failed to demand bargaining over the subject,” 
                                            
15 Tr, at pp 94-95. 
16 Tr, at p 96. 
17 Tr, at p 110-111. 
18 Tr, at p 255. 
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despite having received notice of the impending change.19  The Board has long held 
that “[w]hile a demand is a necessary precondition to an obligation under the Act to 
negotiate the impact of an employer’s decision, the duty to negotiate a change to a 
mandatory subject of negotiations does not require a demand” as a precondition to the 
filing of a charge.20   Likewise, a charge premised on a refusal to negotiate on demand 
is distinct from a charge “premised on a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment,” and “[t]herefore, a demand to negotiate is not a condition precedent to the 
violation found” in the latter case.21  Rather, the Board has held that “a unilateral 
subcontract of unit work is itself a per se rejection of the bargaining process and a 
refusal to bargain. No demand to bargain is necessary in such circumstance.”22   
  The College invites us to reject this well-developed and long-standing body of 
case law “as it is inconsistent with sound labor relations policy and well-established law 
in the private sector.”23  As the Act expressly provides, however, “fundamental 
distinctions between private and public employment shall be recognized, and no body of 
                                            
19 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 25. 
20 City of Niagara Falls, 44 PERB ¶ 3015, 3055 (2011) (footnotes omitted), confd, City of 
Niagara Falls v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 45 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2012) 
(Ceresia, J.), citing Bd of Educ, City Sch Dist,City of NY, 40 PERB ¶ 3002 (2007); Great 
Neck Water Pollution Control Dist, 28 PERB ¶ 3030 (1995); see also City of Niagara 
Falls, 31 PERB ¶ 3085, 3190-3191 (1998); Germantown Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB ¶ 
3003, at 3007 (1993), annulled on other grounds, sub nom Germantown Cent Sch Dist 
v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 205 AD2d 961, 27 PERB ¶ 7009 (3d Dept 1994). 
21 City of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB ¶ 3085, at 3190, citing Roma v Ruffo, 92 NY2d 489, 
495 (1998).  
22 Id, quoting Germantown Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3007; State of New York 
(UCS), 28 PERB ¶ 3014, 3039, n. 10 (1995); see also Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free 
Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 232 AD2d 560, 20 PERB ¶ 7019 (2d Dept 
1996) (“Where, as here, an improper practice charge is grounded upon a theory of 
unilateral subcontracting, the attempted initiation of negotiations by the employee 
organization is not a prerequisite to the filing of an improper practice charge”). 
23 Brief in Support of Exceptions, at 26; see id at 26-27. 
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federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to private employment, shall be regarded 
as binding or controlling precedent.”24  In particular, the policy undergirding this 
provision is especially salient where, as here, “there is well-established case law under 
the Act,” and our adoption of private sector precedent would upend the parties’ long-
settled expectation, working a forfeiture of rights.25  Thus, we reject the College’s waiver 
argument,26 and move on to its exceptions treating with the ALJ’s findings on the merits. 
 The parties relied upon, and the ALJ therefore treated with, a line of decisions 
holding that the unilateral abolition of full-time positions and the contemporaneous 
creation of part-time positions to perform the duties of those abolished violates the Act 
unless the employer demonstrates that the same level of services can be completed in 
fewer hours or establishes that the employer has made a good faith reduction in 
services.  This line of cases, most recently explicated in County of Erie,27 expands upon 
the Board’s decisions in Central School District of the City of New Rochelle,28 and City 
School District of the City of Oswego.29  New Rochelle CSD established the principle 
that the decision to lay employees off is non-mandatory, while Oswego CSD found that 
                                            
24 Act, § 209-a (6). 
25 City University of NY, 40 PERB ¶ 3004, 3013 (2007). 
26 In any event, the evidence does not support a finding of waiver as neither “the 
express relinquishment of specified rights [nor] the use of language that establishes ‘a 
clear, intentional, and unmistakable relinquishment of the right to negotiate the 
particular subject at issue’ by relieving the other party of the duty to negotiate on that 
subject” has been demonstrated.  Orchard Park Cent Sch Dist, 47 PERB ¶ 3029, 3089 
(2014).  Nor does the evidence establish that the “specific subject has been negotiated 
to fruition,” as necessary to establish duty satisfaction.”  Id.  Thus, we affirm the ALJ’s 
finding that neither waiver nor duty satisfaction apply here, and deny the exceptions to 
those findings. 
27 43 PERB ¶ 3016 (2010), confd sub nom County of Erie v New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 81 AD3d 1313, 44 PERB ¶ 7002 (4th Dept 2011). 
28 4 PERB ¶ 3060, 3075-3076 (1971). 
29 5 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3023-3024 (1972), confd sub nom City School Dist of City of 
Oswego v Helsby, 42 AD2d 262, 6 PERB ¶ 7008 (3d Dept 1973). 
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New Rochelle did not permit the reduction of the hours and wages of positions absent 
proof that the same level of services can be completed in fewer hours or that the 
employer has made a good faith reduction in services.   
 In all of these cases, the interests advanced by the union was that of the unit 
members, whose hours had been reduced, and, concomitantly, their wages.  To the 
extent that this matter has been litigated under the principles set forth in the Erie line of 
cases, the ESP has not established a violation.  No employee’s bargaining unit 
member’s position was abolished by the College, nor has any bargaining unit member’s  
hours and wages been reduced. 
Moreover, with regard to the Academic Program Office, the College put forth 
evidence germane to one of the Erie criteria, that the work could be done in less time 
than it had been previously performed in.  In addition to Rosenthal’s testimony regarding 
the reduced use of clerical support after his predecessor’s departure, and the increased 
use of technological resources to replace clerical services, the fact that Pasik and 
Nowey each only worked four days, with each being off on a different day, implicitly 
corroborates that the necessary hours in which the work is performed has decreased.30  
Under the facts before us, the College’s showing might well be sufficient to defeat a 
claimed violation of the Act had the College reduced the hours and wages of unit 
members.   
However, the claims before us more properly sound in a transfer of exclusive 
                                            
30 The value of such implicit corroboration should not be overestimated, however; as the 
College itself avers, the alleged change in the need for Pasik and Nowey’s services 
“markedly decreased” on the retirement of Debbie Moeckel and her replacement by 
Jeffrey Rosenthal in 2010—at least 2 years before the conduct at issue took 
place. (Brief in Support of Exceptions at p. 9).     
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bargaining unit work, precipitated by the College’s response to a series of voluntary 
retirements.  The interests implicated in such a transfer case include any resultant 
“collective harm to the bargaining unit as well as individual harm to the bargaining unit 
members.”31  In particular, “the rights of organization and representation, guaranteed by 
§§ 202 and 203 of the Act, can be diminished when the scope of the bargaining unit is 
unilaterally reduced.”32  The collective harm at issue in transfer cases are the reason 
that, unlike in cases involving reduction of hours and wages, “[t]he asserted merits or 
demerits of a decision to transfer unit work, including the fiscal and operational wisdom 
of a decision . . . , are immaterial to whether the subject matter is mandatorily 
negotiable.”33 Accordingly, the decisions leading up to Erie shed no light on the live 
claims before us here.34         
 As such is the case, the dispositive questions here are whether the work at issue 
was in fact bargaining unit work, and, if so, was the change nonetheless justified under 
the Act.  In addressing these questions, we have recently reaffirmed that: 
there are two essential questions that must be determined 
                                            
31 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, 3021 (2008), confirmed and mod 
in part, sub nom Manhasset USFD v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 
PERB ¶ 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittur, 42 PERB ¶ 3016 (2009), citing Niagara 
Frontier Transp Auth, 18 PERB ¶ 3083 (1985); see also State of New York (Div of Mil 
and Naval Affairs), 27 PERB ¶ 3027, 3068 (1994). 
32 Id. 
33 Id., citing City of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB ¶ 3085 (1998). 
34 County of Erie, 43 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3060; County of Broome, 21 PERB ¶ 4606, 4786 
(1988), affd, 22 PERB ¶ 3018 (1989); Vestal Cent Sch Dist, 15 PERB ¶ 3006, confd sub 
nom Vestal Teachers Assn v Newman, 95 AD2d 940, 16 PERB ¶ 7020 (3rd Dept 1983).  
Likewise, our decisions regarding staffing levels do not involve the transfer of work 
outside the bargaining unit, and are thus not germane to the issues before us.  See, 
e.g., City of Canandaigua, 47 PERB ¶ 3025, 3072 (2014) (“abolition of positions is a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining and, as the duties of that position were not 
transferred outside the bargaining unit, the claimed breach of the unit's exclusivity has 
not been established”). 
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when deciding whether the transfer of unit work violates 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act: a) was the work at-issue exclusively 
performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to 
have become binding; and b) was the work assigned to non-
unit personnel substantially similar to the exclusive unit work. 
If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, we 
will find a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act unless there is a 
significant change in job qualifications. Where there is a 
significant change in job qualifications we must balance the 
respective interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees to determine whether § 209-a. 1(d) of the Act has 
been violated.35 
 
 In Manhasset Union Free School District, the Board found other criteria 
“discerned from prior precedent, as providing guidance for determining whether a 
discernible boundary exists in transfer of unit work cases,” and listed those criteria as: 
the nature and frequency of the work performed, the 
geographic location where the work is performed, the 
employer's explicit or implicit rationale for the practice, and 
other facts establishing that the at-issue work has been 
treated as distinct from work performed by non[-]unit 
personnel.36 
 
  In terms of the duration of the practice, the Board has “never identified a specific 
period that is required to establish exclusivity ‘because the sufficiency of 
the duration depends upon the circumstances of each particular fact pattern.’”37  Thus, 
in City of New Rochelle, the Board found that the exclusive performance of the at-issue 
duties for one year was sufficient to have become binding under the facts and 
                                            
35 State of New York (Div of State Police), 48 PERB ¶ 3012, 3041 (2015), quoting Town 
of Riverhead, 42 PERB ¶ 3032, 3119 (2009); see generally Manhasset Union Free Sch 
Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, 3021-3022 (2008), confirmed and mod in part, sub 
nom. Manhasset USFD v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB ¶ 
7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittur, 42 PERB ¶ 3016 (2009). 
36 41 PERB ¶ 3005 at 3025; see also Buffalo City Sch Dist, 45 PERB ¶ 3002 (2012). 
37 County of Columbia, 45 PERB ¶ 3025, (2012) (quoting City of New Rochelle, 44 
PERB ¶3002, 3027 (2011)); see also Buffalo City Sch Dist, 45 PERB ¶ 3002, at 3003. 
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circumstances,38 while in Buffalo City School District, a unit member’s “sole 
performance of the duties of the on-site help desk over the nine-month period [was] 
sufficient to demonstrate a binding past practice to establish exclusivity under the Act.”39  
In each case, the question to be decided is “whether there is sufficient evidence that a 
reasonable expectation was created that the practice of [unit] members performing the 
work exclusively would continue.40  
 Notably, “[t]he asserted merits or demerits of a decision to transfer unit work, 
including the fiscal and operational wisdom of a decision to privatize, are immaterial to 
whether the subject matter is mandatorily negotiable.”41  The Board has long held that: 
It is, however, precisely because [an employer’s] decision 
turned upon the labor costs involved that the transfer of work 
is amenable to resolution in the collective bargaining 
process. The bargaining process affords the parties an 
opportunity, for example, to obtain general or specific salary 
and benefit compromises which might have eliminated the 
District's felt need to transfer the work outside the unit. 42 
 
Had the College pleaded and proved an operational necessity defense, its 
financial circumstances may have been relevant, but it did not do so.  Accordingly, the 
College’s exceptions based upon the ALJ’s refusal to consider the College’s financial 
circumstances are, to the extent they are intended to relate to the transfer of unit work 
claim, and not to the question of reduction in services, denied.  
                                            
38 City of New Rochelle, 44 PERB ¶ 3002, at 3027. 
39 Buffalo City Sch Dist, 45 PERB ¶ 3002, at 3003. 
40 Id. 
41 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3021, citing City of Niagara 
Falls, 31 PERB ¶ 3085 (1998). 
42 Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist, 28 PERB ¶ 3039, confd sub nom Hewlett-
Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 232 AD2d 560, 20 
PERB ¶ 7019 (2d Dept 1996); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 
3021 (quoting Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist). 
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We now turn to the College’s specific exceptions regarding the transfers of the 
at-issue work.  
Nursing and Athletics Offices 
 The College does not contest the exclusivity to the unit of the work performed by 
senior typist Janet Mudge prior to her retirement from her position in the Nursing and 
Athletic Offices.43  Rather, the College contends that when Mudge was re-hired on a 
part-time basis, her work was limited to the Nursing Department, with her former duties 
in the Athletic Office being assigned to a newly-hired part-time employee, Christine 
Nichols, who was subsequently laid off.  Thus, the College maintains, Mudge’s part-time 
position was a newly constituted position with different duties from those she performed 
prior to her retirement, and Nichols’s layoff after the filing of the charge renders the 
status of her work non-justiciable. 
 However, this argument suffers from the fallacy of assuming that the interests at 
stake are solely those of the individuals performing the work, and not those of the 
bargaining unit as a whole.  As the Board explained in Germantown Central School 
District: 
To accept the District's argument would permit it and all 
other public employers to avoid any bargaining duty 
regarding a decision to transfer unit work simply by timing 
the transfer to take effect at a time after the unit employees 
                                            
43 Although the College formally “[e]xcepts to the ALJ’s determination that the College 
does not dispute ESP’s exclusivity over the work at issue in Nursing, PE and APO,” 
none of the transcript references provided refer to testimony that, prior to Mudge’s 
retirement, any non-unit employee performed the same work as Mudge.  Exceptions, 
No. 13, citing Tr, at pp 119, 120-122, 136, 146, 252.  The only cited transcript page to 
discuss Mudge, or the Nursing or Athletics Offices contains no such testimony, and only 
discusses the nature of her work in general terms.  Tr, at p 252.  Nor do the relevant 
sections of the College’s Brief in Support of Exceptions contain any such assertion.  Id. 
at pp 11, 15-16.  
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have been removed from their jobs.  Furthermore, the 
District's argument ignores that the violation turns on 
the transfer of bargaining unit work, not the loss of 
any individual’s position.44 
 
Rather, “[u]nless the qualifications for the position have been changed 
significantly, the loss of unit work is sufficient for the finding of a violation.”45  As no such 
significant change in qualifications has been demonstrated, the transfer of the work 
outside the unit is sufficient to establish the violation.  
The College claims that the “[t]here is no showing in the record that the duties 
relating to the Athletics Department are being performed outside of the unit (following 
the layoff of Nichols).”46  This contention does not negate the elements of the charge as 
found by the ALJ.  Thus, the College has not demonstrated that the ALJ erred in finding 
that ESP carried its burden of proving the charge.  Rather, the College has asserted 
grounds for the limitation of any remedy to the time period during which Nichols 
performed the Athletics Office work that Mudge had performed prior to her retirement.   
As the Board has long held, “subsequent compliance does not cure the 
statutory violation by the employer. It merely goes to the nature of the remedy to be 
afforded to the” charging party.47   The College’s showing would not negate the finding 
of a violation, although it could limit the scope of, or even obviate the need for, make 
                                            
44 26 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3007; see also Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth, 18 PERB ¶ 3083, 
3182 (1985); County of Erie, 39 PERB ¶ 3016, 3057 (2006). 
45 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3022. 
46 Brief in Support of Exceptions, at 16. 
47 Bd of Educ of the City of Buffalo, 4 PERB ¶ 3090, 3757 (1971); see generally 
Levittown Union Free Sch Dist, 14 PERB ¶ 3019, 3035 (1981); Plainedge Union Free 
Sch Dist., 31 PERB ¶ 3063, 3140 (1998), citing Wappingers Cent Sch Dist v Pub Empl 
Relations Bd,  215 AD2d 669, 670, 28 PERB ¶ 7007, 7017 (2d Dept 1995). 
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whole relief under the ALJ’s remedial order.48  
Finally, the College does not in any way adduce evidence or argument that the 
qualifications for the positions have in any material way been altered.  Indeed, in view of 
the fact that the transferred duties were precisely the same, and Mudge was re-hired to 
perform half of them, and no evidence suggests that Nichols had different qualifications 
for the position, no support for such an argument can be gleaned from the record. 
The College did not plead or prove the elements of what the Board has 
previously characterized as a compelling need defense, in that it has not offered 
evidence “that it had no other options open to it but to transfer [ESP’s] unit work, that it 
had negotiated that transfer to impasse with [ESP], or that it was willing to continue 
negotiations after the transfers.”49  The record in this case is devoid of evidence that the 
College had no other options available to it, or that the College made any attempt to 
negotiate the transfer of the at-issue functions to part-time employees.  In so 
concluding, we are not implying that the College must designate and remunerate as a 
full-time employee an individual to perform part-time duties.   Rather, we simply hold 
that the College could not unilaterally transfer bargaining unit work to persons 
occupying non-unit part-time positions without satisfying its duty to negotiate with ESP.  
The Board has long recognized that subcontracting of bargaining unit work is “a 
technique that can be used by management to undermine its agreement and/or duty to 
                                            
48 Id. 
49 New York City Transit Auth, 30 PERB ¶ 3004, 3009 (1997), citing City of Rochester, 
27 PERB ¶ 3031 (1994); New York City Transit Auth., 19 PERB ¶ 3043 (1986); 
Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB ¶ 3037 (1986). See also Town of West Seneca, 
19 PERB ¶ 3028 (1986).  
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reach agreement on other terms and conditions of employment.”50  Taken to an extreme 
in this case, if the College were to replace all full-time positions with non-unit part-time 
positions, it would effectively be able to avoid its obligations under the collective 
bargaining agreement as well as its duty to negotiate with ESP under the Act. 
Accordingly, the College’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision as they relate to the 
transfer of unit work in the Nursing and Athletic Offices lack merit, and the ALJ’s 
findings as to this transfer are affirmed. 
Academic Programs Office 
 The College contests that the work performed by senior typist Melanie Pasik and 
principal stenographer Darlene Nowey was exclusive to the unit, arguing that “the 
record evidence established that, historically, the APO was staffed with full-time and 
part-time (non-unit) clerical staff.”51  The College specifies that “ESP presented 
evidence that Ms. [Patricia] Hamberger, as a part-time, non-unit employee in APO 
performed the same duties as both Ms. Pasik and Ms. Nowey and that those duties 
have not changed.”52   However, Ms. Hamberger testified that she began employment 
at the College in the APO in 1992 and worked “in that office a total of five years,” 
serving between “’92 to ’97.”53  Steven Keeler, Chair of the Humanities Division, and the 
supervisor of Pasik and Nowey, testified that, although he could not be sure of the exact 
year, five or six years prior to events in question, the part-time position in the APO was  
  
                                            
50 Sommers Faculty Assn, 9 PERB ¶ 3014 (1976). 
51 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 16. 
52 Id (emphasis in original). 
53 Tr., at pp 119, 121. 
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eliminated and a full-time bargaining unit position established.54  Thus, the factual bases 
upon which the ALJ concluded that the work had been exclusive to the bargaining unit 
for that time period remain unrefuted, and no other grounds to defeat exclusivity as to 
the work in the APO has been established. 
 Nor has the College established that the ALJ’s finding that Pasik and Nowey 
continued to perform their prior duties as part-time, non-unit employees constituted 
error.  As the Board has often stated, “[c]redibility determinations by an ALJ are 
generally entitled to ‘great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record 
compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.’”55  Here, no 
objective evidence has been raised compelling a contrary conclusion.   
In the absence of any such contrary objective evidence, the ALJ did not err in 
crediting the testimony of Keeler and Hamberger that Pasik and Nowey continued to 
perform the same clerical duties as they had as full-time employees.  While the College 
questioned the ESP’s failure to call Pasik and Nowey themselves, none of the ESP’s 
evidence as to the duties they performed was refuted.  Indeed, the College’s own 
witness, Whalen, testified that Nowey and Pasik each “backfilled her own position.”56  
Nor does the College claim that the qualifications for the position have changed—
unsurprisingly, as the work is being performed by the prior incumbents in the full-time 
                                            
54  Keeler testified on November 19, 2013, over 10 months after the events in question, 
that the part-time position was replaced with a full-time position “and that’s got to go 
back maybe six, or seven years.”  Tr, at pp 146-147. 
55 Dutchess Comm College, 47 PERB ¶ 3018, 3056 (2014) quoting, Manhasset Union 
Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3019; County of Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, 3062 
(2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist., 41 PERB ¶ 3020 (2008); see also, City of 
Rochester, 23 PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB ¶ 3054 
(1979); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 (1977). 
56 Tr, at p 255. 
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position.57  Finally, as with the positions in the Nursing and Athletics Offices, the College 
has neither pleaded nor proved “operational necessity” sufficient to support what the 
Board has termed in some cases a compelling need defense.  There is no evidence in 
the record that the College “had no other options open to it but to transfer [ESP’s] unit 
work, that it had negotiated that transfer to impasse with [ESP], or that it was willing to 
continue negotiations after the transfers.”58  Accordingly, we deny the exceptions to the 
ALJ’s decision as they relate to the transfer of unit work in the APO, and the ALJ’s 
findings as to this transfer of exclusive unit work are affirmed. 
Office Manager-Campus Services Office 
The ALJ found to be exclusive to the unit “[t]he primary duties of the office 
manager in the campus services office, ie, the management responsibilities of 
scheduling and overseeing the work of the office and switchboard staff, as well as the 
management of the campus mailboxes and bulk mailings.”59  This finding was 
predicated on the ALJ’s crediting Sharon Bower’s testimony, and finding that, during the 
                                            
57 The College does except to the ALJ’s finding that the level of services has not 
changed.  However, as explained above, that contention relates to a claimed reduction 
of hours (and thus wages) of bargaining unit members, and not to a transfer of exclusive 
unit work outside the bargaining unit, absent a change of qualifications requiring 
balancing of the parties’ interests.  As part-time employees are excluded from the 
bargaining unit here, this case is properly viewed as a transfer of unit work and not as a 
reduction of hours case.  Compare County of Erie, 43 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3060, with City 
of Canandaigua, 47 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3072; Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent Sch Dist, 25 
PERB ¶ 3066 (1992).    
58 New York City Transit Auth, 30 PERB ¶ 3004, 3009 (1997), citing City of Rochester, 
27 PERB ¶ 3031 (1994); New York City Transit Auth., 19 PERB ¶ 3043 (1986); 
Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 19 PERB ¶ 3037 (1986).  See also Manhasset Union Free 
School District, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3107 (“Indeed, it is well-settled that an employer 
may not unilaterally change a term and condition of employment unless it has 
negotiated the change in good faith to the point of impasse, has an urgent need to do 
so, and continues to negotiate thereafter to an agreement”).  
59 47 PERB ¶ 4599, at 4886. 
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five years Bower had held the position, “no non-unit employees had performed these 
tasks prior to January 2013.”60  More specifically, Bower testified that she would consult 
Whalen on non-routine scheduling difficulties and allocation of scarce mailboxes, which 
they would resolve together, and that she kept him informed of other matters.   As was 
the case in County of Columbia,61 the subordinate performed tasks under the direction 
of her supervisor, and with his occasional involvement when necessary.  As was the 
case in that matter, so too here “we are unwilling to infer from [Whalen’s] general 
supervisory responsibilities over” the CSO, and “his incidental performance” of 
scheduling, that the ESP lacks exclusivity over the work performed.62 
However, the College correctly notes that the Board has “long held that we will 
not find a violation of the Act upon an allegation which has not been pleaded, even if 
that allegation has been litigated.”63  The charge clearly asserts that the College 
distributed Bower’s duties to two other employees, Whalen “and one full-time ES 
Professional.”64  Thus, the ESP is bound by its charge, and we grant the College’s 
exception to the extent that we modify the ALJ’s finding to dismiss any claim arising out 
                                            
60 Id. 
61 45 PERB ¶ 3025 (2012). 
62 45 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3058; see also County of Onondaga, 27 PERB ¶ 3048 (1994). 
63 UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB ¶ 3004 (2015) petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 48 PERB ¶ 7003 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting County of 
Rockland, 31 PERB ¶ 3062, 3136 (1998)); see also County of Nassau, 29 PERB ¶ 3016 
(1996); Arlington Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB ¶ 3001 (1992); City of Buffalo, 15 PERB ¶ 
3027 (1982); City of Mt. Vernon, 14 PERB ¶ 3037 (1981). Indeed, even when a motion 
is made to conform the pleadings to the proof, the motion “is essentially a request to 
amend the charge. Leave to amend is not available if the effect is to add a new 
substantive claim otherwise barred by PERB’s four-month statute of limitations.” County 
of Monroe, 36 PERB ¶ 3002, 3005 (2003) (citing Rules § 204.1(a) (1); Town of 
Brookhaven, 26 PERB ¶ 3066 (1993).  
64 Charge, at ¶ Z.  As defined in the charge, “ES Professionals” denotes the ESP and is 
also used to refer to its members.  Id at ¶¶ B, CC.   
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of Bower’s work other than the scheduling reallocated to Whalen.  Moreover, Bower’s 
testimony that her non-supervisory tasks, other than scheduling, were performed by 
both full-time and part-time employees, negates the predicate for finding such tasks 
exclusive to the bargaining unit.  
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed as modified. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the College forthwith: 
1. To the extent, if any, the work of the typist in the Nursing and Physical 
Education Offices is still being performed and has not been returned to 
full-time employees in the ESP unit, return such work to full-time 
employees in the ESP unit, unless and until the parties reach an 
alternative arrangement through negotiations;   
2. Return the work of the senior typist and principal stenographer in the 
Academic Programs Office, and the scheduling work of the office 
manager of the Campus Services Office, to full-time employees in the 
ESP unit, unless and until the parties reach an alternative arrangement 
through negotiations; 
3. Cease and desist from assigning exclusive ESP unit work to non-unit 
employees without negotiating with ESP;  
4. To the extent that any affected employees are identified, make whole such 
employees for loss of wages and benefits, if any, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate; and 
5. Sign and post the Notice attached at all physical and electronic locations 
where the College customarily posts notices to employees represented in 
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the ESP unit. 
DATED:  January 24, 2017  
       Albany, New York 
 
 
 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of Cayuga Community College represented by the 
Cayuga County Community College Educational Support Professionals (ESP) that 
Cayuga Community College will: 
 
1. return the work of the Senior Typist in the Nursing and Physical Education 
Offices, Senior Typist and Principal Stenographer in the Academic Programs 
Office, and the scheduling work of the office manager of the Campus Services 
Office to full-time employees in the ESP unit, unless and until the parties reach 
an alternative arrangement through negotiations; 
 
2. not assign ESP unit work to nonunit employees, unless and until the parties 
reach an alternative arrangement through negotiations; and 
 
3. to the extent any affected employees are identified, make such employees 
whole for loss of wages and benefits, if any, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate.  
 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     on behalf of CAYUGA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
  
 
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting,  
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
 
   
STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
COUNTY OF CHENANGO and CHENANGO 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-33921 
- and -                    
        
 
CHENANGO COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
 
Respondent, 
_______________________________________ 
 
 HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for  
 Charging Party 
 
 JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the Chenango County Law Enforcement Association, Inc. 
(LEA) violated § 209-a.2 (b) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Relations Act 
(Act).1  The ALJ found that the LEA violated the Act by submitting to compulsory interest 
arbitration certain proposals that are not arbitrable under § 209.4 (g) of the Act.   
EXCEPTIONS 
 The LEA excepts to the ALJ’s decision on each of its three proposals and argues 
that all of its proposals are directly related to compensation and are therefore arbitrable.  
In addition, the LEA argues that, to whatever extent the Board finds any of its demands 
to be unitary in nature, the Board should reexamine and reverse its doctrine concerning 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4556 (2015).   
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“unitary demands” explained in, inter alia, County of Tompkins and Tompkins County 
Sheriff.2  The LEA argues that the “unitary demand” doctrine leads to unpredictable and 
inconsistent results that are punitive and contrary to the policies of the Act.   
  For the following reasons, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the ALJ’s 
decision. 
DISCUSSION 
 Section 209.4 (g) of the Act limits the availability of interest arbitration for 
“members of any organized unit of deputy sheriffs who: (1) are engaged directly in 
criminal law enforcement activities that aggregate more than” 50% of their service, and 
(2) are encompassed within the definition of “police officers” pursuant to § 1.20 (34) of 
the Criminal Procedure Law, with certification requirements for both qualifications.  For 
such employees, inclusive of the unit members at issue here, interest arbitration: 
shall only apply to the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements directly relating to compensation, including, but 
not limited to, salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, 
medical and hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to 
non-compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or 
scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility for overtime 
compensation which shall be governed by other provisions 
[prescribed] by law.  
 
 In construing this language, the Board has repeatedly reaffirmed the test for 
determining whether a particular demand is directly related to compensation, and 
therefore arbitrable under § 209.4 (g) of the Act, first articulated in New York State 
Police: 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
                                                     
2 44 PERB ¶ 3024 (2011). 
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predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).  If the effect is otherwise, then the relationship 
of the demand becomes secondary and indirect and the 
subject is, therefore, excluded from the scope of compulsory 
arbitration under the language of § 209.4 [g].3 
 
 As the Board further explained in County of Orange: 
Under that test, each proposal must be examined separately 
to discern whether its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of 
compensation. Consistent with State Police, in applying that 
test, we will compare a proposal with the subjects 
specifically identified by the Legislature as being arbitrable: 
“salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits.” In addition, we will compare the 
proposal with those subjects declared by the Legislature to 
be nonarbitrable: “job security, disciplinary procedures and 
actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation.”4  
 
 In the instant case, the LEA challenges the ALJ’s ruling that three of its proposals 
were not “directly related to compensation” and thus not arbitrable under § 209.4 (g) of 
the Act.  We address each in turn. 
Proposal No. 8, Article 12 – Holidays  
 In its Proposal No. 8, the LEA sought to amend § 12.02 of the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement to increase the number of holidays for which employees are paid 
                                                     
3 30 PERB ¶ 3013, 3028 (1997), confd sub nom New York State Police Investigators 
Assn v NYS Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB ¶ 7011 (Sup Ct Albany County 1997) 
(emphasis in original); see also Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s PBA, 49 PERB ¶ 3029 
(2016); County of Broome, 44 PERB ¶ 3046, 3137 (2011). 
4 44 PERB ¶ 3023, 3080 (2011). 
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at one and one-half times their applicable hourly rates to 13 days from the current six 
days.  The LEA also proposed adding a new paragraph to § 12.02 stating that 
employees who are regularly scheduled off on any of the named holidays shall be paid 
eight hours of pay.  Finally, the LEA proposed adding language to § 12.08 stating that 
an employee who is not regularly scheduled to work on any of the 13 holidays but who 
does work shall be paid two and one-half times the applicable hourly rate for all hours 
worked.5   
 The ALJ found that the first component of Proposal No. 8 was not arbitrable 
because it proposed “an increase in the number of paid holidays for certain unit 
members” and was therefore a demand for additional time off from work without loss of 
pay.  The ALJ found that the second and third component of the LEA’s proposal were 
directly related to compensation and therefore would normally be arbitrable, but that the 
two components were inseparable from the paid holiday component, thus rendering the 
proposal’s components unitary in nature and therefore not arbitrable.6     
 Contrary to the ALJ, we find that the LEA’s proposal to increase the number of 
holidays for which employees are paid at one and one-half times their applicable hourly 
rates is directly related to compensation.  Unlike the demands at issue in New York 
State Police,7 cited by the ALJ, the LEA’s proposal does not seek time off from work 
without loss of pay.  Instead, the sole characteristic of the LEA’s proposal is that 
                                                     
5 Ex. 3, at 3-4.  
6 When a unitary demand contains an inseparable nonarbitrable component, the 
demand does not satisfy the arbitrability test under § 209.4 (g) of the Act.  See County 
of Orange, 44 PERB ¶ 3023, at 3081.  
7 30 PERB ¶3013, at 3029. 
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employees will receive increased compensation for particular days worked.8  Because 
the “sole characteristic” of the LEA’s proposal is a modification in the amount of 
compensation, we find that this component is arbitrable.9  
 As the ALJ correctly found, the second and third components of Proposal No. 8 
are both directly related to compensation and are thus arbitrable.  Even assuming that 
the three components of Proposal No. 8 constitute a unitary demand, then, the entire 
proposal is properly submitted to arbitration.10   
Proposal No. 15, Article 26 – Workers’ Compensation  
 Proposal No. 15 seeks to amend existing §§ 26.01 and 26.02 of the CBA to state 
that all employees shall be covered by Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) and to 
incorporate General Municipal Law Section 207-c procedures into the CBA.11  We find 
that the ALJ properly concluded that this proposal was nonarbitrable.  As the ALJ found, 
the Board addressed a similar proposal in County of Tompkins.12  The Board found that, 
although compensation was a component of the proposal, the proposal was neither a 
wage payment procedure nor purely compensatory in nature.  We follow that holding 
here.  Because the proposal addresses subjects that are not directly related to 
                                                     
8 Other provisions of § 12.02 of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement do provide 
paid holidays off for certain employees.  However, the LEA’s proposal does not affect 
those provisions and does nothing to change paid holidays off for those employees.  
9 County of Tompkins, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3089.  
10 We decline the LEA’s invitation to revisit and/or reverse the “unitary demand” 
doctrine.  As explained in County of Tompkins, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3088, such an 
approach is necessitated by the Legislature’s public policy choice of dividing the subject 
matter of proposals for deputy sheriffs into two classes with distinct impasse 
procedures.  See also, County of Orange, 44 PERB ¶ 3023, at 3088.  Here, all three 
components of the LEA’s proposal are mandatory subjects of bargaining and are 
directly related to compensation.  As a result, all three components are arbitrable.   
11 Ex. 3, at 5.  
12 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3088. 
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compensation (such as the content of the medical information release form), it is 
nonarbitrable.13      
Proposal No. 22, paragraphs 5 through 8 – New Article – Canine Unit 
 At issue with respect to Proposal No. 22 are the following paragraphs:  
5. The following expenses associated with the K-9 unit shall 
be provided by the County at no cost:  
a. The purchasing of the dog(s). 
b. A marked take home police vehicle for transporting the 
police dog(s), which shall remain the property of the County.  
The police vehicle shall contain a cage for the dog(s). 
c. A chain link fence for enclosing an area for the dog(s) to 
live at the K-9 employee’s residence, which, if feasible, shall 
remain the property of the County. 
d. A “dog house” which shall remain the property of the 
County. 
e. Alternate kennel arrangements for housing the dog(s) 
when the K-9 employee is unavailable, or as otherwise 
becomes necessary (i.e. vacation, illness, etc.). 
f. All veterinary service(s) and related expenses for the care 
of the dog(s) which shall receive the prior approval of the 
Sheriff or designee. 
g. All necessary and required equipment which shall receive 
the prior approval of the Sheriff or designee. 
h. All dog food.  
 
6.  The County agrees that the employee(s) assigned to the 
K-9 unit shall be considered “on duty” for the purposes of 
receiving General Municipal Law Section 207-c status, and 
applying to the New York State Employees’ Retirement 
System, with respect to becoming disabled whenever that 
employee is performing tasks or activities “off duty” 
necessary and reasonable involving the training, care and 
maintenance of the dog(s), regardless of where or when 
these tasks or activities are performed. 
 
7. The County will defend and indemnify each employee 
assigned to the K-9 unit for any injuries or damages caused 
by his/her dog(s) which occur or are claimed to have 
occurred in the performance of his/her duty during the period 
in which such employee is or was assigned to the K-9 unit.  
                                                     
13 Id. 
Case No. U-33921   - 7 - 
     
 
 
8. All dogs purchased and provided to the K-9 unit shall 
remain the property of the County until the retirement of the 
dog(s) from the K-9 unit.  At that time, the K-9 employee 
assigned to that dog(s) shall be offered the opportunity to 
purchase the dog(s) from the County for the sum of one 
dollar ($1.00), and, if purchased, shall become the owner of 
the dog(s).14 
 
 The ALJ analyzed each of the four paragraphs above and, with the exception of 
paragraph 5 (f), found that the proposal was nonarbitrable.   
 With respect to paragraph 5, we agree with the ALJ that certain of the items are 
requests for equipment and are thus nonarbitrable.15  Specifically, we find that the 
demands contained in paragraph 5 (b), (c), (d), and (g) are requests for the use of 
County property and are not directly related to compensation.     
 As the LEA points out in its exceptions, the Board has previously found the 
provision of veterinary care and food for out-of-service canines to be “an economic 
benefit and thus a form of compensation for unit employees,” making both mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.16  We find that the same rationale applies to in-service canines, 
making the LEA’s demands in paragraphs 5 (f) and (h) mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.  However, finding that a contract term is mandatorily negotiable does not 
necessarily resolve issues of arbitrability under § 209.4 (g), which requires a separate 
and more stringent analysis to determine whether a demand is directly related to 
compensation.17  We find that the LEA’s proposals for veterinary care and dog food are 
directly related to compensation.  Both of these proposals relate to costs inherently 
                                                     
14 Ex. 3, at 9-10.  
15 County of Tompkins, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3089. 
16 City of Kingston, 40 PERB ¶ 3015, 3058 (2007).   
17 See County of Putnam, 38 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3104. 
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associated with the care and custody of an animal which, if not paid for by the County, 
must be paid for by the unit employee.  The same analysis applies to expenses arising 
out of alternate kennel arrangements for housing the police dog(s) when the K-9 
employee is unavailable.  As a result, we find that the primary characteristic of 
paragraphs 5 (e), (f), and (h) of the LEA’s Proposal No. 22 are compensation, and these 
proposals are therefore arbitrable.  Moreover, we find that paragraph 5 (a), related to the 
purchasing of dogs, requires payment from the County on behalf of employees.  This 
paragraph is therefore directly related to compensation and arbitrable.18   
 We affirm the ALJ’s finding that paragraph 6 is nonmandatory and, therefore, not 
arbitrable because the proposal would deprive the Joint Employer of its statutory right to 
make initial General Municipal Law § 207-c eligibility determinations.19  We also find 
that paragraph 7, while a mandatory subject of bargaining,20 is not directly related to 
compensation and therefore is not arbitrable.  This is especially true because, as the 
ALJ found, the proposal “would deprive the County of the right to challenge a claim for 
indemnification on the basis that the injuries or damages did not occur while [the] K-9 
officer was on duty.”21  This aspect is more akin to a procedural demand that 
determines eligibility for indemnification and does not relate to compensation.22   
Lastly, we find that paragraph 8’s primary characteristic relates to the disposition 
of County property and does not seek to effect a meaningful change in the amount or 
level of compensation.  As a result, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that paragraph 8 is not 
                                                     
18 State Police, 30 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3028.  
19 See Chenango County Law Enforcement Association, 45 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3005.   
20 See Patrolmen’s Benev Assn of Newburgh New York, Inc., 18 PERB ¶ 3065 (1985).  
21 48 PERB ¶ 4556, at 4705.  
22 See Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s PBA, 49 PERB ¶ 3029. 
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directly related to compensation and is also not arbitrable. 
 In sum, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the LEA violated § 209-a.2 (b) of the Act 
by submitting Proposal No. 15 and paragraphs 5 (b), (c), (d), and (g) of Proposal No. 22 
to compulsory interest arbitration.  We also affirm the ALJ’s finding that paragraph 5 (f) 
of Proposal No. 15 is arbitrable.  We reverse the ALJ and find that paragraphs 5 (a), (e), 
and (h) of Proposal No. 22 and Proposal No. 8, in its entirety, are arbitrable.   
DATED:  January 24, 2017 
       Albany, New York 
 
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
DIANE PAYSON, 
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-33647 
- and - 
 
MOUNT PLEASANT COTTAGE UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
Respondent. 
__________________________________________ 
 
GLASS KRAKOWER LLP (BRYAN D. GLASS of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
 
SHAW, PERELSON, MAY & LAMBERT, LLP (STEVEN M. 
LATINO of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Diane Payson to a decision and 
order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge, in 
which she alleged that the Mount Pleasant Cottage Union Free School District (District) 
retaliated against her in violation of §§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by terminating her internships and reducing her duties and 
hours.1  The ALJ found that Payson had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliatory motive.  Specifically, the ALJ found that Payson had failed to show that the 
District had knowledge of her protected activity.  Independently, the ALJ found that 
Payson failed to present evidence sufficient to support an inference that unlawfully 
motivated interference or discrimination was the cause of the District’s decision to stop 
supporting Payson’s internships and to reduce Payson’s hours and duties.  Further, 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4584 (2015).   
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2 
even assuming that Payson had effectively established a prima facie case, the ALJ 
found that the District proved that it acted for legitimate business reasons.   
EXCEPTIONS  
Payson’s exceptions boil down to an argument that the ALJ erred in finding 
Superintendent James Gaudette’s testimony credible.  Specifically, Payson argues that 
Gaudette made untrue statements regarding how the District is reimbursed by New 
York State for certain positions within the district.  Payson also argues that the ALJ 
omitted or mischaracterized certain evidence.  In sum, Payson argues that there was 
“more than a sufficient basis to find Superintendent Gaudette retaliated against Payson 
following her union involvement . . . .”  The District supports the decision of the ALJ and 
contends that no basis has been demonstrated for reversal.   
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ’s decision.   
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  The District is a special act school 
district.  Gaudette has been superintendent since July 2011.  Monica Baron was hired in 
2012 as chairperson of the Committee on Special Education, and she became principal 
in September 2013.   
 Payson was hired in April 2003 as a full-time school counselor.  Payson’s job 
duties changed from school counselor to full-time guidance counselor in August 2011.  
In the 2012-2013 school year, Gaudette assigned Payson to extra duties as test 
coordinator and “Ease of Entry” coordinator.  In August 2013, he recommended her for 
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an administrative internship involving both a building-level and a district-level 
internship.2   
 In January 2014, Payson became more involved in the union and spoke at 
membership meetings held in January and February.  Payson was also involved with a 
committee that was preparing a school climate survey which, when completed, would 
be submitted to Gaudette and the District’s board. 
 In March 2014, Payson was advised by Terry Ott, who administered the program 
that sponsored her internships, that the building internship was being postponed so she 
could focus on her guidance activities.   
 On April 4, 2014, Baron called Payson to her office and advised her to bring 
 union representation.   At the meeting, Baron advised Payson that all of her duties 
except completing senior graduation assignments were being reassigned to a school 
social worker and a psychologist.  Baron explained that Gaudette had instructed her to 
lighten Payson’s load.   
 On April 29, 2014, Gaudette informed Payson that he would no longer support 
her district-level internship.3  Then, in May 2014, Payson received a letter from 
Gaudette advising that her position was reduced to a .15 full-time equivalent (FTE), 
consisting of one day of work a week, for four hours.4  The letter cites “economy and 
efficiency” as the reasons for the reduction in hours. 
 When Gaudette became superintendent, the District had a budget deficit of close 
                                                     
2 Charging Party’s Exhibit 15. 
3 Charging Party’s Exhibit 27. 
4 Charging Party’s Exhibit 30. 
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to $5.8 million,5 and there was discussion about budget concerns and potential job cuts 
from the time Gaudette started at the District.  Referencing the School Age Staffing 
Standard Model,6 Gaudette testified that he studied rate reimbursement schedules and 
looked for ways to utilize staff so as to maximize available money.  Gaudette’s 
testimony specifically referred to pages 7 and 16 of the School Age Staffing Standard 
Model, which address reimbursement methods for guidance counselors and social 
workers, noting that reimbursement for guidance counselors is made according to the 
number of students in a caseload, whereas for social workers and psychologists it is 
based on the number of clinical sessions per student.   
Gaudette further explained that the tenure line is what defines the reimbursement 
rate.  Also, certified guidance counselors are required in only certain circumstances and 
Part 100 of the Commissioner’s Regulations applicable to schools in New York State 
does not require that guidance counselors perform all of the traditional guidance 
counselor functions.  Gaudette testified that he determined that if he used staff 
members other than Payson to perform her functions, he could yield a better 
reimbursement rate.  Gaudette also testified that no one ever reported to him what 
occurred in union meetings or the nature of any staff member’s involvement in union 
matters.   
 On rebuttal, Payson disputed Gaudette’s testimony regarding the state 
reimbursement formula based on a document she obtained through a FOIL request and 
an alleged discussion with an unnamed source at SED.7 
                                                     
5 Respondent’s Exhibit 15. 
6 Respondent’s Exhibit 17.  
7 Tr. 751-754.  
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DISCUSSION 
 When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated retaliation in 
violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, the charging party has the burden of 
demonstrating three elements by a preponderance of the credible evidence: a) that the 
affected individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was 
known to the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment 
action would not have been taken “but for” the protected activity.8  These elements 
establish a prima facie case and give rise to an inference of improper motivation.9  Only 
“if the charging party can establish such an inference, does the burden of production 
shift to the respondent to present evidence demonstrating that its conduct was not 
improperly motivated.”10 
 Here, the ALJ found that Payson had failed to show that Gaudette, as the 
decision-maker, had knowledge of Payson’s union activity.  The ALJ also credited 
Gaudette’s explanation of his reasons for eliminating Payson’s internships and for 
reducing her duties and position.   
 We find that the record adequately supports the findings of fact and credibility 
determinations made by the ALJ.  Credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally 
entitled to “great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a 
conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.  This is especially true 
                                                     
8 Bellmore-Merrick Cent High Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3022, 3976 (2015); citing Village of 
Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3050 (2014); see generally, UFT, Local 2, AFL-CIO 
(Jenkins), 41 PERB ¶ 3007 (2008), confd sub nom Jenkins v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 41 PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup Ct NY Co 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB ¶ 7008 (1st 
Dept 2009); State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB ¶ 
3021 (2013); see also City of Salamanca, 18 PERB ¶ 3012 (1985).  
9 See Town of Tuscarora, 48 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3037.  
10 Id.; see generally, Littlejohn v City of New York, 795 F3d 297, 307-308 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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where, as here, the credibility determination rests in part on the witness’ demeanor.”11  
Here, Payson has not provided any such objective evidence that establishes that the 
ALJ manifestly erred.12  Even assuming that Payson’s evidence establishes that 
Gaudette’s understanding of how the District is reimbursed by New York State is 
incorrect, that evidence does not undermine the ALJ’s finding that Gaudette held a 
good-faith belief that his interpretation was correct and acted accordingly when deciding 
to reduce Payson’s position.13   
Moreover, Payson has not pointed to any evidence in the record that even 
arguably demonstrates that Gaudette had knowledge of Payson’s union activity.  
Because she has failed to demonstrate this element by a preponderance of the credible 
evidence, Payson has failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawfully motivated 
                                                     
11 Bellmore-Merrick Cent Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3002, at (quoting UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB ¶ 
3004 (2015)); see also County of Clinton, 47 PERB ¶ 3026, 3079 (2014) 
and Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶3005, at 3019 (2008); citing County of 
Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3020 
(2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB 
¶ 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 (1977); see also County of 
Ulster, 39 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3045-3046 (citing Fashion Institute of Technology v Helsby, 
44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB ¶ 7005, 7009 (1st Dept 1974)) (deference due credibility 
determinations based on observation of witness's demeanor). 
12 To the extent that Payson relies in her exceptions brief on evidence that was not 
introduced at the hearing, we disregard it.  The Board has long held that “we will not 
consider allegations of fact made for the first time in exceptions when reviewing an 
ALJ's decision because our review is limited to the record as it was developed before 
the ALJ.”  CSEA (Josey), 49 PERB ¶ 3022, 3072 (2016) (quoting Smithtown Fire 
District, 28 PERB ¶ 3060, 3135 (1995). 
13 Payson also argues that Gaudette “intentionally made a false statement under sworn 
testimony that he was unaware of . . . Payson’s certification in School Psychology.”  
Contrary to Payson’s argument, the fact that Payson holds a certificate in School 
Psychology and that this information in her personnel file does not provide objective 
evidence that Gaudette knew of her certification, only that his statement was incorrect.   
Payson’s exceptions also argue that the ALJ failed to find all relevant facts concerning 
Baron’s actions.  We find any omissions to be immaterial, since the ALJ found that 
Gaudette alone made all decisions concerning Payson.   
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retaliation.14   
 In sum, on the record before us, we find that the ALJ’s factual determination that 
the District lacked knowledge of Payson’s union activity and was not motivated by anti-
union animus was neither unsupported by the record nor manifestly incorrect.  
Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision to dismiss Payson’s charge alleging that the 
District violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act.   
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  January 24, 2017 
       Albany, New York 
 
 
                                                     
14 In her exceptions, Payson states that she “attempted to subpoena Daria Kolesar as a 
hostile witness.”  Payson did not, however, seek a subpoena from the ALJ.  See § 211 
of the Rules of Procedure.  Payson also did not seek an adjournment or otherwise 
attempt to enforce the subpoena that her attorney had apparently issued and served.  
As a result, there are no rulings of the ALJ in front of the Board for review.  
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER  
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department 
of Transportation) (State or DOT) to a decision and order of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the State violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally terminating the practice of assigning State-owned 
vehicles to unit employees for commuting purposes.  The ALJ also found that the State 
violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act by issuing revised W-2s to employees named 
in the charge in Case No. U-32893 in retaliation for their participation in that charge.1  
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4569 (2015).   
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The ALJ ordered the State to make whole unit employees who were issued a revised 
W-2, to rescind and/or correct any documents in the employer’s possession or provided 
by the employer to any other state or federal entity that do not accurately reflect the 
affected employees’ taxable income for 2012, and to post a notice.2   
EXCEPTIONS 
 The State excepts to the ALJ’s decision on numerous grounds.  In Case No. U-
32893, the State argues, inter alia, that the change did not violate an established past 
practice because the grant of State-owned vehicles to unit employees for commuting 
purposes was conditional on its yearly determination of whether use of a State-owned 
vehicle to commute “is for the benefit of the State.”3   In Case No. U-33274, the State 
argues that PEF failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory motive and that, 
even if a violation is found, the ALJ’s remedy should be modified.  PEF supports the 
ALJ’s decision in all respects.   
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.   
Case No. U-32893 
The employees at issue in this case are employed in the Region 8 DOT Highway 
and Maintenance Department and hold the titles of Assistant Resident Engineer, Permit 
Engineer, and Senior Equipment Operator Instructor.  For a number of years, the 
affected employees had been assigned a State-owned vehicle on a full time basis that 
                                            
2 Id., at 4757.  
3 State’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, at 29.   
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could be used, in addition to work purposes, to commute to and from the employee’s 
home.  On or about May 10, 2013, DOT management notified affected employees that 
DOT was not approving employees’ requests for full-time vehicle assignments, including 
use of the vehicles for commuting, for the time period April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014.4   
 In order to be assigned a vehicle for commuting purposes, employees were 
annually required to complete and submit an “EM-30” form, which was labeled as a 
“request for permanent/temporary assignment of State-owned passenger vehicle”.5  The 
form required the employee to indicate a “justification” for their vehicle assignment.6  
The justification was required to comport with DOT’s Manual Administrative Policies and 
Procedures (MAP).7  Section I of the MAP provides that “State-owned vehicles are 
provided to Department employees . . . for the benefit of the State, not the convenience 
of the employee.”  The MAP provides that an evaluation of the continued use of 
assigned vehicles is conducted at the beginning of each fiscal year.8  “The purpose of 
this review is to determine whether continuation of the assignment is appropriate.”9  
Finally, Section IV.D covers commuting in State vehicles, and states, among other 
things, that a State vehicle may be used to commute “when it can be demonstrated that 
such vehicle use is for the benefit of the State . . . .”10  The MAP remained in effect and 
unchanged prior to and after the 2013 vehicle assignment denials.11  Prior to the 
                                            
4 ALJ Exhibit 1, ¶ 9; ALJ Exhibit 3, ¶ 1. 
5 Transcript, pp. 48-50; Charging Party Exhibit 1.  
6 Charging Party Exhibit 1.   
7 Transcript, pp.49-53, 89-90. 
8 Joint Exhibit 2, at § III.   
9 Id.  
10 Joint Exhibit 2, at § IV.D.2. 
11 Transcript, p. 201.  
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employee requests that were denied in 2013, the EM-30 forms were consistently signed 
and approved by the employees’ direct supervisors and/or Peter Teliska, Regional 
Highway Maintenance Engineer.   
Case No. U-33274 
 The charge in Case No. U-32893, discussed above, was filed on July 26, 2013.  
On September 24, 2013, a pre-hearing conference was held.  Among those present at 
the conference was Ray LaMarco, DOT Director of Labor Relations.12  On October 4, 
2013, most of the employees named in the charge were sent letters from Michael 
Fazioli, DOT Director of Accounting.13  The letters stated that DOT’s records indicated 
that the employee was assigned a State-owned vehicle that was also used for 
commuting and that the employee had not filed the appropriate form to report the 
taxable value of personal use of an employer-provided vehicle.  This form, called an 
“AC-3173,” provides a choice of three possible methods of computing taxable value and 
instructs that the employee is to select their preferred calculation method.14   The three 
computation methods are: (1) Cents-per-mile rule and valuation; (2) Commuting rule 
and valuation; and (3) Annual lease value rule and valuation.15   
 The letters from Fazioli went on to state that “[a] calculation was provided to the 
Office of the State Comptroller based on the mileage from your home to your official 
work station. . .” (that is, using the “cents-per-mile” method of computing taxable value) 
and that employees would be receiving revised W-2s based on the taxable valuation of 
                                            
12 ALJ Exhibit 7, ¶ 12; ALJ Exhibit 9, ¶ 1.   
13 Transcript, p. 38; ALJ Exhibit 1, ¶ 7; Charging Party 6; Joint Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 29, 
32, 36, 45, 54, 57, 62, 67.   
14 Joint Exhibit 4.    
15 Id.  
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their use of State-owned vehicles for commuting.16  The “cents per mile” valuation 
method chosen by DOT resulted in the maximum additional income as compared to 
either the “commuting rule” or the “annual lease value rule”.17  The letters indicated that 
carbon copies had been sent to “P.J. Snyder, Assistant Commissioner, Administrative 
Services” and “R. LaMarco, Director, Employees Relations Bureau.”18   
 Some of the employees who received letters from Fazioli had submitted the 
required AC-3173 forms and others had noted on their EM-30 forms that their assigned 
vehicles were not being used for commuting.19  Others were commuting in exempt 
vehicles and, pursuant to DOT guidelines, were not required to file AC-3173 forms.20                 
 Peter Snyder, the Assistant Commissioner for Administrative Services, is 
LaMarco’s direct supervisor.21  On cross-examination, Snyder testified that he was 
given a copy of the charge in Case No. U-32893 and that after reviewing it, he ordered 
an audit on the employees named therein.22  Snyder testified that he believed that those 
employees constituted a “representative sample” of DOT employees, which would 
enable him to assess employee compliance of reporting taxable commuting benefits 
statewide.23  Snyder testified that these employees were the only employees chosen for 
this audit.24  He further testified that the purpose of the audit was to determine whether 
                                            
16 See Charging Party Exhibit 6; Joint Exhibits 13,19, 24, 29, 32, 36, 45, 54, 57, 62, 67.    
17 Transcript, p. 84.   
18 See Charging Party Exhibit 6; Joint Exhibits 13,19, 24, 29, 32, 36, 45, 54, 57, 62, 67.    
19 Transcript, pp. 111-113; Respondent Exhibit 8; Joint Exhibits 11, 14, 30, 31, 33, 37, 
48, 60, 63, 64, 68.    
20 Transcript, pp. 105-107. 
21 Transcript, pp. 214-215. 
22 Transcript, p. 218.   
23 Transcript, pp. 210-211.  
24 Transcript, pp. 218-219.  
Case Nos. U-32893 & U-33274  - 6 - 
 
 
  
the employees who had filed EM-30s requesting vehicle assignments had also filed the 
appropriate AC-3173 forms to report the taxable value of those vehicle assignments.25  
Snyder testified that the audit procedures were as follows:  
The audit department contacted the payroll unit and inquired 
if the AC’s had been filed by those people.  The payroll unit 
reported that back to the audit group.  The audit group 
recommended to the accounting bureau that these people 
need to file forms.  They hadn’t filed forms.  So as the 
supervisor of the accounting bureau under which the payroll 
unit is organized in our department, Mr. Fazioli sent the 
letters to the employees.26    
 
 Snyder testified that the “cents-per-mile” valuation rule was chosen 
“[b]ecause it was the most representative appropriate method that we could 
use.”27  On cross-examination, Snyder acknowledged that other valuation 
methods could have been used.28  
DISCUSSION  
Case No. U-32893 
The Court of Appeals has recently acknowledged and reaffirmed that “employee 
use of an employer-owned vehicle for transportation to and from work is an economic 
benefit and a mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment; therefore, a 
public employer may not unilaterally discontinue a past practice of providing its  
  
                                            
25 Transcript, p. 209. 
26 Transcript, p. 124.  
27 Transcript, p. 212. 
28 Transcript, pp. 226-227.  
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employees with this benefit.” 29  In order to establish an enforceable past practice, a 
charging party must demonstrate that the practice at issue was unequivocal and 
continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to give 
rise to a reasonable expectation among the affected unit members that the practice 
would continue.30 
Contrary to the ALJ, we find that PEF has not demonstrated an enforceable past 
practice of assigning State-owned vehicles for commuting purposes here, where 
employees had to annually request a vehicle for commuting purposes under a policy 
that allowed the State to make an annual determination on the request based on 
whether such an assignment was “for the benefit of the State.”   
When a benefit is granted under an express reservation of right, which remains 
unchanged by subsequent negotiations, the modification or cessation of the benefit in 
accordance with the retained right cannot be considered an impermissible unilateral 
change.31  Here, the State expressly reserved the right to determine whether use of a 
State vehicle for commuting purposes is “for the benefit of the State” each year.  This 
determination is akin to determining whether such use is in the State’s best interests.  
                                            
29 Town of Islip v Pub Empl Rel Bd, 23 NY3d 482, 491, 47 PERB ¶ 7002 (2014).  The 
Board has long held that the provision of employer-owned vehicles to employees for 
personal use is an economic benefit and, therefore, a mandatory subject of negotiation.  
See, eg, County of Nassau, 38 PERB ¶ 3005, 3014 (2005), citing County of Nassau, 35 
PERB ¶ 3036 (2002), County of Monroe and Sheriff, 33 PERB ¶ 3044, 3118 (2000), 
and County of Nassau, 26 PERB ¶ 3040, 3068 confd sub nom County of Nassau v 
PERB, 215 AD2d 381, 28 PERB ¶7011 (2d Dep't 1995).  
30 Chenango Forks Cent School Dist, 40 PERB ¶ 3012, 3046-3047 (2007), confd sub 
nom Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 95 AD3d 
1479, 45 PERB ¶ 7006 (3d Dept 2012), confd, 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB ¶ 7008 (2013). 
31 County of Nassau, 38 PERB ¶ 3030, 3101 (2005); State of New York (Department of 
Health), 25 PERB ¶ 3005, 3018 (1992), confirmed sub nom Public Empl Fedn v NYS 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 195 AD2d 930, 26 PERB ¶7008 (3d Dept 1993).    
Case Nos. U-32893 & U-33274  - 8 - 
 
 
  
We have long held that where the evidence of a practice to extend a benefit to 
employees establishes that “a decision is made annually, and it is not automatic,” but 
rather is based on “the agency’s best interests” at the time, the practice at issue is one 
which vests discretion in the employer.”32  Because the State retained discretion to 
annually reevaluate whether employees would be assigned a vehicle for commuting 
purposes, we find, contrary to the ALJ, that employees could not have formed a 
reasonable expectation that they would always be assigned a vehicle for such use.   
We hold that the State’s decision not to assign take-home vehicles in 2013 was 
consistent with its policy and practice and that employees were not, therefore, entitled to 
be assigned vehicles for commuting purposes in 2013.  The ALJ’s decision and order 
with respect to charge U-32893 is accordingly reversed.   
Case No. U-33274 
 When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated retaliation in 
violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, the charging party has the burden of 
demonstrating three elements by a preponderance of the credible evidence: a) that the 
affected individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was 
known to the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment 
action would not have been taken “but for” the protected activity.33  These elements 
                                            
32 State of New York (Office of State Comptroller), 48 PERB ¶ 3009, 3030 (2015); State 
of New York (Department of Health), 25 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3018.   
33 Bellmore-Merrick Cent High Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3022, 3976 (2015); citing Village of 
Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3050 (2014); see generally, UFT, Local 2, AFL-CIO 
(Jenkins), 41 PERB ¶ 3007 (2008), confd sub nom Jenkins v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 41 PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup Ct NY Co 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB ¶ 7008 (1st 
Dept 2009); State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB        
¶ 3021 (2013); see also, City of Salamanca, 18 PERB ¶ 3012 (1985).  
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establish a prima facie case and give rise to an inference of improper motivation.34  A 
charging party can establish the existence of anti-union animus by statements or by 
circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by evidence of legitimate business 
reasons for the actions taken, unless those reasons are found to be pretextual.35   
 We affirm the ALJ’s finding that PEF established a prima facie case. The burden 
of establishing a prima facie case is a relatively low one, and the timing and context of 
an employer's conduct may be sufficient to establish an inference of improper 
motivation, thereby shifting the burden of production to the respondent to come forward 
with evidence demonstrating a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged conduct.36  
Here, PEF showed, on its case-in-chief, that 15 unit employees were named in the 
charge in Case No. U-32893 and that LaMarco attended the pre-hearing conference on 
this charge on September 24, 2013 and without doubt knew of these employees’ 
protected activity in filing the charge.  Against this background, DOT sent a letter dated 
October 4, 2013, copied to LaMarco, to the majority of the employees named in the 
charge, advising them that they would be receiving revised W-2s increasing their 2012 
taxable income due to their use of State-owned commuting vehicles.  This evidence is 
sufficient to raise the inference that the decision to issue revised W-2s to only those 
employees named in the improper practice charge was causally linked to their protected 
activity, establishing an inference of improper motivation.37   
                                            
34 See Town of Tuscarora, 48 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3037.  
35 See State of New York (SUNY), 38 PERB ¶ 3019 (2005), confirmed sub nom CSEA v 
New York state Pub Empl Rel Bd, 35 AD3d 1005, 39 PERB ¶ 7012 (3d Dept 2006).   
36 Jenkins, 41 PERB ¶ 3007, at 3043.   
37 Because we find that PEF’s evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, 
we find that the ALJ did not err in denying the State’s motion to dismiss.   
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 The inference of retaliatory motivation was more than substantiated by Snyder’s 
testimony on cross-examination, although not in the precise way suggested by PEF’s 
case-in-chief.  As the ALJ found, the only employees who received revised W-2s were 
those named in the charge in Case No. U-32893.  Snyder, LaMarco’s direct supervisor, 
testified that he provided these names to his audit department after reviewing the 
charge, and the ALJ declined to credit his proffered legitimate business reason 
testimony that these employees were a “representative sample” used to assess 
statewide compliance.  By his own admission, Snyder’s focus was on those whose 
names were listed in the charge.  An audit of the taxable benefit for all of those 
department-wide who had been authorized to use state vehicles for personal purpose 
as a matter of broad fiscal propriety would more credibly support Snyder’s claim that he 
was attempting to assess statewide compliance.  The ALJ’s decision was further 
supported by the State’s not verifying whether employees had, in fact, filed AC-3173 
forms, were actually commuting in State-owned vehicles, or were exempt from filing.  In 
other words, the State failed to determine whether employees’ W-2s required any 
adjustment, but simply made an across-the-board determination that employees named 
in the charge for Case No. U-32893 would receive a revised W-2, with the taxable 
benefit calculated at the highest rate possible.  Nor has the State identified any 
“objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is 
manifestly incorrect.”38 
 In these circumstances, the record evidence amply supports the ALJ’s finding 
that the State would not have issued the revised W-2s at issue here to employees but 
                                            
38 County of Nassau, 48 PERB ¶ 3023, 3084 (2015). 
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for the filing of the charge and employees’ participation therein and that the State’s 
asserted reasons for sending employees revised W-2s were pretextual.   
 Although we affirm the ALJ’s finding of a violation, we modify the remedy to 
account for the unique circumstances here.  In order to allow employees to recover 
overpayment of taxes that resulted from the State’s discriminatory issuance of revised 
W-2s, we shall order the State to review affected employees’ use of State-owned 
vehicle use for commuting purposes for 2012; to allow employees to select a lawful 
method from the options available to them for calculation of the taxable value of 
personal use of an employer-provided vehicle for 2012 if such a calculation is 
necessary; and to correct W-2s and any other documents in the employer’s possession 
or provided by the employer to any other state or federal entity that do not accurately 
reflect the affected employees’ taxable income for 2012, with copies to affected 
employees.   
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ’s findings are affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and the ALJ’s order is MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:  
1) Cease and desist from retaliating against unit members for their engagement in 
protected activity, specifically participating in charges brought before the Board.   
2) Review affected employees’ use of State-owned vehicle use for commuting 
purposes for 2012; allow employees to select a lawful method from the options 
available to them for calculation of the taxable value of personal use of an 
employer-provided vehicle for 2012; and correct W-2s and any other documents 
in the employer’s possession or provided by the employer to any other state or 
federal entity that do not accurately reflect the affected employees’ taxable 
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income for 2012, with copies to affected employees, in order that employees may 
be made whole through recovering overpayment of taxes that resulted from the 
State’s discriminatory issuance of revised W-2s; and   
3) Sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
 
DATED:  January 24, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Transportation) in 
the bargaining unit represented by the New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-
CIO that the State will: 
 
1. Not retaliate against unit members for their engagement in protected activity, 
specifically participating in charges brought before the Board; and 
 
2. Review affected employees’ use of State-owned vehicle use for commuting 
purposes for 2012; allow employees to select a lawful method from the 
options available to them for calculation of the taxable value of personal use 
of an employer-provided vehicle for 2012; and correct W-2s and any other 
documents in the employer’s possession or provided by the employer to any 
other state or federal entity that do not accurately reflect the affected 
employees’ taxable income for 2012, with copies to affected employees, in 
order that employees may be made whole through recovering overpayment of 
taxes that resulted from the State’s discriminatory issuance of revised W-2s.   
 
    
Dated . . . . . . . . . .    By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
        (Representative)   (Title) 
 
 
           State of New York (Department of Transportation) 
          . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
 














